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ABSTRACT 
In the present investigation we conducted three studies to examine how unconscious valence 
processing influences participants’ quality judgments in an attribute-framing task. In Studies 1 
and 2 we observed how individuals who had depleted cognitive resources, through distraction 
(Study 2) and time constraint (Study 3), differed in their responses to an attribute-framing task. 
In Study 3 we subliminally primed participants with attribute frames and then presented them 
with a frameless decision task. Our results revealed that attribute framing arises from 
unconscious valence processing and conscious processing may only play a role when the 
frame is especially salient. 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Every day we face numerous situations that require us to 
evaluate and decide among alternatives. The processes 
involved in how we evaluate and make choices have garnered 
considerable research attention. At the heart of this 
interest lies the belief that a better understanding of the 
processes involved in how people evaluate alternatives 
and make decisions should allow for more accurate and 
unbiased decision-making. 
 
Inevitably, when we are faced with decisions, select 
words are used for presentation. Most research has dealt 
with decision tasks that present participants with alternatives 
of positive or negative valences, commonly referred to 
as the frame (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Research has 
shown that how decision problems are framed has a profound 
influence on the alternatives that people choose (see 
Kühberger, 1998; Levin, Schneider & Gaeth, 1998 for 
reviews). Prior research (Levin et al., 1998) has identified 
three fundamentally different ways or ‘typologies’ that 
researchers have used to manipulate the frame: riskychoice, 
goal and attribute framing. Most research investigating 
framing effects has focused on risky-choice framing. 
The current study is designed to focus on the processes 
involved in attribute framing, an area that has not been 
widely investigated. Attribute framing involves manipulating 
the wording of objectively equivalent information. The 
task is designed so that the framing manipulations will 
either accentuate the positive aspects of the target, or accentuate 
the negative aspects. For example, Levin and Gaeth 
(1988) asked participants to evaluate ground beef that was 
labelled as either 75% lean or 25% fat. In their study, they 
found that the ground beef was rated more positively when 
it was labeled as 75% lean as opposed to 25% fat. While the 
parameters of attribute framing were clearly defined by 
Levin et al. (1998), research has not examined the processes 
that may underlie this effect. 
 
 
Subliminal priming 
 
When a stimulus prime is presented subliminally, it can 
have profound influences on later judgments without 
the person’s conscious awareness. Further, activation of 
valence information (positive or negative) seems to precede 
other forms of information (e.g. Bargh, Chaiken, Govender 
& Pratto, 1992). Therefore, without the person being 
consciously aware, subliminally presented stimuli can 
influence valence reactions toward a stimulus (e.g. Chen & 
Bargh, 1999; McConnell & Leibold, 2001). By automatically 
activating either positive or negative valences, the 
primed stimulus exerts its valence on an otherwise ambiguous 
target (e.g. Stapel & Koomen, 2005). Therefore, if the 
positive or negative valence of a task carries weight in 
the decision-making process, then one could predict that 
priming valence words, either positive or negative, will 
influence how decision-makers evaluate ambiguous targets. 
That is to say, if a positively valenced prime is subliminally 
presented, it should automatically activate positive-related 
information and exert its influence on the task at hand; 
negatively valenced primes should function in a similar 
manner. 
 
Further evidence for the influence of automatic valance 
information can be found in research examining the selective 
accessibility model (Mussweiler, 2003). According to 
this model, knowledge is made accessible through positive 
or negative social comparisons and, in turn, influences individuals’ 
self-evaluations. In a more relevant extension of 
the model, Mussweiler & Englich (2005) demonstrated that 
participants assimilate their judgments of a target toward 
subliminally presented stimuli (i.e. the anchor). The finding 
that individuals gravitate their decisions toward subliminally 
presented information supports our assertion that 
attribute-framing effects are largely unconscious. 
 
 
Current investigation 
 
In the current set of studies we attempted to investigate the 
role of automatic valence processing in attribute framing. 
Specifically, we wanted to examine whether attributeframing 
effects, similar to other valence-based behaviours 
(e.g. Chen & Bargh, 1999), are rendered by automatic processes, 
or whether they involve more conscious processing. 
If very early valence priming is found to influence decision 
choice, then this suggests a decision-making process that is 
predicated by automatic-evaluative tendencies that act to 
shape later decision choice. 
 
To examine this question, we conducted a series of 
studies designed to test the role that unconscious processing 
plays in attribute-framing effects. In studies 1 and 
2 we relied on procedures designed to diminish conscious 
resources and allow for relatively more influence of 
unconscious processing. If attribute framing relies more 
upon conscious processing, then framing effects should 
be attenuated when conscious resources are diminished. 
Alternatively, if attribute framing effects are largely due 
to unconscious processing, then there should be little or 
no difference in the strength of the framing effect when 
cognitive resources are taxed. In study 3, we wanted to 
further examine our hypothesis using methodology that 
is free of cognitive load. To do so, we subliminally 
primed participants with either a positive or a negative 
attribute frame and presented them with a ‘frameless’ 
attribute decision task. Consistent with prior research, we 
hypothesized that for Studies 1 and 2 placing participants 
under cognitive load would not substantially reduce 
attribute framing. In Study 3 we hypothesized that when 
the valence frame is primed subliminally, the unconsciously 
activated frame will exert its influence and colour 
the subsequent evaluation of a ‘valence neutral’ framing 
task. 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
Method 
 
Participants and design. Eighty participants took part in 
this investigation. The design of our study was a 2 (distraction, 
no distraction) x 2 (frame: positive, negative frame) 
factorial design. Participants’ quality ratings of the target 
object (beef) acted as our dependent variable. 
Procedure. After arriving for the study, participants were 
assigned to a condition of distraction or no distraction. 
Participants in the distraction condition were seated at a 
computer and given headphones. After getting comfortable 
and adjusting their headphones, they were given written 
instructions that informed them they would be answering a 
series of questions, while listening to a 5 min audio file that 
contained a short story. Additional instructions required 
subjects to count the number of times they heard the word 
‘green’ within the short story.An audio file was prearranged 
in their computer terminal. After the audio file had begun, 
participants were instructed to turn over the paper in front 
of them and begin answering the questions. Participants 
were given a questionnaire that contained the beef attribution 
task and asked to rate the quality of the beef on 
a seven-point scale ranging from ‘low quality’ to ‘high 
quality’. This was followed by three subsequent questions 
used to measure the effect of framing. After listening to the 
audio file, subjects indicated the total number of times they 
heard the word ‘green’ within the short story. 
Participants in the no-distraction condition were seated 
in the same computer terminal and allowed to get comfortable. 
They were then provided with written instructions 
informing them that they would be answering a series of 
questions. Participants were then instructed to turn over 
the paper and begin. The stimuli contained the attributeframing 
task and a series of questions. After completing the 
task, all participants were debriefed and thanked for their 
participation. 
 
 
Results 
 
In accordance with our hypothesis, if attribute-framing 
effects are largely a function of automatic processing, 
then the distraction manipulation should not influence the 
attribute-framing effect. Alternatively, if conscious processing 
does play a significant role in attribute framing, then 
distracting a person should lessen the framing effect. To test 
this prediction, we carried out a 2 ¥ 2 anova with level of 
distraction and frame acting as the independent variables. 
Participant’s quality rating of the target (beef) acted as the 
dependent variable.1 The results of this analysis revealed 
a main effect for the attribute-frame condition F(1,76) = 
21.83, p < 0.001. However, the interaction between 
attribute frame and level of distraction did not approach 
significance F(1,76) = 0.12, p > 0.7 and neither the positive 
nor the negative framing condition appeared to render any 
effects from the distraction (Table 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
In Study 1 we used a distraction task to test whether depleting 
cognitive resources would influence the strength of 
attribute framing. This methodology represents a traditional 
means for testing such an assumption and the null finding 
supports our hypothesis. However, in Study 2 we wanted 
to use a different type of methodology and also alter the 
presentation of the scenario. Therefore, in Study 2 we 
used a time-pressure technique to manipulate conscious 
resources and again tested whether conscious processing 
appears to play a substantial role in attribute framing. 
Further, we also manipulated the percentage information 
for the target to maximize the conditions for observing 
conscious involvement. 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants and design. One-hundred and twenty undergraduate 
students at Appalachian State University took part 
in the study. Participants were randomly assigned to the 
time-pressure or no-pressure condition as well as the positive, 
negative attribute-framing conditions. This yielded a 2 
(time pressure, no restriction) x 2 (positive frame, negative 
frame) between-subjects factorial design. The dependent 
variable in this study was the quality rating assessment 
question used in Study 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Procedure and materials. After agreeing to take part in the 
study, participants were given one of two sets of instructions 
prior to beginning the attribute-framing task. Participants in 
the no time-pressure condition were not given time restriction 
and were told to begin the task and turn the paper over 
when they finished. Participants in the time-pressure condition 
were told that they had 20 s to complete the task. Prior 
testing had showed this to be the optimal amount of time for 
participants to actually complete the task but still feel very 
hurried in doing so. The experimenter was visible in front 
of each participant and noted the time on a time-keeping 
device. After reading the instructions, participants were told 
to turn the paper over and begin; at this interval the experimenter 
began timing the task. After 20 s, participants were 
instructed to stop working and turn the paper over. 
The task used in this study was the same as that used in 
Experiment 1 except that in this study we altered the percentages 
of fat and lean to 50% in both framing conditions. 
Specifically, in Study 1, the beef was represented as it has 
been traditionally, 75% lean and 25% fat. We reasoned that, 
by modifying the probabilities to an even 50%, this should 
reduce the framing effect in both conditions if individuals 
consciously processed the percentage from an expected 
value approach, or it may act to maximize saliency to participants, 
so that conscious processing would be observed [2]. 
 
 
Results 
 
Similar to Study 2, we wanted to explore whether depletion 
of cognitive resources would influence the strength of 
attribute framing. To explore this question we again performed 
a 2 x 2 anova with level of cognitive capability 
(time pressure, no time pressure) and attribute frame 
(positive, negative) serving as our independent variables. 
Participants’ quality rating of the target (beef) acted as our 
dependent variable. The results from this analysis revealed a 
significant main effect for attribute framing F(1,116) = 28.5, 
p < 0.001. As predicted, the interaction between time pressure 
and framing did not reach a level of statistical significance 
F(1,116) = 2.6, p < 0.11.As can be seen in Table 2, the 
means for the positive-framing condition are equal, and the 
effect is largely driven by the negative-framing condition. 
To investigate whether individuals in the losses condition 
may have been significantly affected by our time-pressure 
manipulation, we performed a post-hoc analysis, focusing 
solely on the negative framing ‘50% fat’ condition. This 
analysis revealed that individuals who were not cognitively 
constrained by time pressure rated the quality of the beef 
significantly lower than those individuals who were under 
time pressure F(1,58) = 4.04, p < 0.05. 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
 
In Studies 1 and 2 we used methodology that limited the 
availability of cognitive resources. In doing so, we found 
that attribute-framing effects still occur, suggesting this 
effect is due to unconscious processing. In our third study 
we used subliminal priming, a method that tests unconscious 
processing without depleting cognitive resources. 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants and design. The participants in our study 
were 100 Appalachian State University undergraduate students. 
All of our participants received class credit for taking 
part in the study. The design of our study was a one-way 
factorial design with valence of primed stimulus (negative, 
positive) acting as our independent variable, and participant’s 
evaluation of the decision task as our dependent 
variable. 
 
Materials and procedure. After consenting to take part in 
the study, participants were seated at a computer and told 
that they would be asked for their opinion about a task. 
They were then asked to follow the instructions presented 
to them on the monitor. Participants were further told that 
during the study a fixation symbol ‘+’ would appear in the 
centre of the screen and they should focus their attention at 
that point. After pressing the space bar, participants were 
presented with the task introduction used in Studies 1 and 2. 
Specifically, participants were asked to: ‘Assume that you 
are inviting a special friend to dinner and that you are 
making lasagna with ground beef’. Next, they were presented 
with the attribute frame (i.e. ‘fat’ or ‘lean’) subliminally. 
The attribute frame was flashed in the centre of the 
screen for 30 ms. The prime was followed directly afterward 
with a 50 ms mask (••). Following the prime, participants 
were asked to evaluate the beef on the same scale 
used in the previous studies. After completion of the task, 
all of our participants were provided with a funnel debriefing 
measure wherein they were asked questions building 
toward ascertaining knowledge of the subliminal prime 
(Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). Afterward, participants 
completed an unrelated paper and pencil task and were 
debriefed from the study. 
 
 
Results 
 
To investigate our hypothesis we carried out a one-way 
anova3 with subliminal prime valence (positive, negative) 
acting as our independent variable, and participants’ evaluation 
scores serving as our dependent variable. The results 
of this analysis revealed a significant effect for valence of 
subliminal prime F(1,92) = 6.97, p < 0.01. Consistent with 
prior research, when the positive frame (lean) was subliminally 
presented, it generated higher quality ratings 
(M = 5.9) than the subliminally presented negative frame 
(fat) (M = 5). These data indicate that the subliminal 
presentation of valence primes profoundly influenced 
participant’s evaluation. 
 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In our investigation we examined the unconscious nature 
of attribute framing across three studies. In the first two 
studies we discovered that when cognitive resources are 
limited (i.e. distraction and time constraint) attribute framing 
effects still occur, providing good evidence that 
this effect is carried out by unconscious processing. In our 
third study, we subliminally primed the attribute frames and 
observed their effects on participants’ choices. This experiment 
demonstrated that unconscious priming of valence 
information can have wieldy and predictable effects on a 
valence neutral attribute task. This finding was consistent 
with the previous two studies and supported our hypothesis 
that attribute-framing effects are largely a product of 
unconscious processing. 
 
While our studies provide strong support for the influence 
of unconscious processing in attribute framing, the 
findings in the losses condition of Study 3 may seem somewhat 
surprising and intriguing, specifically, the finding that 
participant’s quality ratings were lower for the negative 
target (fat) when there was no time pressure. Although our 
reasoning is post-hoc, we believe that the negativity from 
the 50% fat beef was so profound that it caused participants 
to become ‘attentive’ to this undesirable information. 
Consequently, when participants had time to consciously 
process this information they rated the 50% fat beef as 
lower in quality than participants who were under time 
pressure and had no opportunity to consciously evaluate 
this information. In essence, modifying the percentages 
appeared to magnify the valence of the negative attribute 
frame and induce conscious processing. This observation 
seems well grounded, even pronounced by Kahneman and 
Tversky’s (1979) classic depiction that ‘losses loom larger 
than gains’. 
 
Our findings also open the door to future research investigating 
how automatic evaluations influence subsequent 
decision-making. For example, there has been a good deal 
of recent interest in how the style of processing (McElroy & 
Seta, 2003; Igou & Bless, 2007; Stanovich, 2008), memory 
retrieval (Reyna & Brainerd, 1991), emotional-rational 
inconsistencies (Wang, 2006) and individual differences 
(Chatterjee, Heath, Milberg & France, 2000; Levin, Gaeth, 
Scheriber & Lauriola, 2002; Xie & Wang, 2003; Simon, 
Fagley & Halleran, 2004; Wang, 2004; McElroy & Seta, 
2007; McElroy, Seta &Waring, 2007; Dickinson & Drummond, 
2008) play out in the framing process and decision 
choice. Further, this may provide insight on recent findings 
that show incompatibility between trust and choice 
in decision-making (Keren, 2007). While these factors 
have all yielded insight into how the framing process 
occurs, future research should examine how automatic and 
unconscious processing operates in conjunction with these 
processes to better understand the decision-making 
process. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1. All of the remaining three questions relevant to the target were 
highly correlated with each other as well as question 1. We 
wanted to focus our analysis on question 1 to maintain consistency 
and comparability across the studies. Further, when we 
used the average across the items, all of the statistical results 
remained consistent with the reported data on question 1. 
 
2. Special thanks to Yoshi Kashima for directing us to this question. 
 
3. While none of the participants guessed the hypothesis of our 
study, six of the participants indicated that they saw words 
similar in nature (and valence) to our subliminal primes; therefore, 
we excluded them from further analyses. 
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